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Background: The Government of Lao Peoples’ Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) has embarked on a path to achieve
universal health coverage (UHC) through implementation of four risk-protection schemes. One of these schemes is
community-based health insurance (CBHI) – a voluntary scheme that targets roughly half the population. However,
after 12 years of implementation, coverage through CBHI remains very low. Increasing coverage of the scheme
would require expansion to households in both villages where CBHI is currently operating, and new geographic
areas. In this study we explore the prospects of both types of expansion by examining household and district
level data.
Methods: Using a household survey based on a case-comparison design of 3000 households, we examine the
determinants of enrolment at the household level in areas where the scheme is currently operating. We model the
determinants of enrolment using a probit model and predicted probabilities. Findings from focus group discussions
are used to explain the quantitative findings. To examine the prospects for geographic scale-up, we use secondary
data to compare characteristics of districts with and without insurance, using a combination of univariate and
multivariate analyses. The multivariate analysis is a probit model, which models the factors associated with roll-out
of CBHI to the districts.
Results: The household findings show that enrolment is concentrated among the better off and that adverse
selection is present in the scheme. The district level findings show that to date, the scheme has been implemented
in the most affluent areas, in closest proximity to the district hospitals, and in areas where quality of care is
relatively good.
Conclusions: The household-level findings indicate that the scheme suffers from poor risk-pooling, which threatens
financial sustainability. The district-level findings call into question whether or not the Government of Laos can
successfully expand to more remote, less affluent districts, with lower population density. We discuss the policy
implications of the findings and specifically address whether CBHI can serve as a foundation for a national scheme,
while exploring alternative approaches to reaching the informal sector in Laos and other countries attempting to
achieve UHC.
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Since the World Health Organization (WHO) endorsed
a resolution encouraging countries to progress towards
universal health coverage (UHC) [1], much momentum
has been gained and the world is in the midst of a
“financing transition”. This transition refers to a movement
away from financing health care through out-of-pocket
payments towards health insurance and risk-pooling
schemes, to ensure that the entire population has af-
fordable access to key health interventions without risk
of impoverishment [2]. In December 2012, the United
Nations passed a resolution urging member states to pro-
vide affordable health care for all, thereby increasing gov-
ernment accountability for pursuing the goal of universal
coverage.
Many high-income countries that are progressing
towards, or have already achieved, universal coverage
have relied heavily on general taxation, social health
insurance or a mix of both [3,4]. However, in many low-
and middle income countries striving towards universal
coverage, a pluralistic health financing system typically
evolves whereby a mix of health insurance and risk-
protection schemes are targeted at distinct socio-eco-
nomic groups. The two most common schemes are social
health insurance for formal sector workers and general tax
finance for the poor and vulnerable, as this latter group is
generally accepted as the responsibility of the government.
The non-poor informal sector, which generally comprises
a substantial share of the population in low- and middle-
income countries, is much more difficult to reach and is
often the last to be covered. This is because these workers
are often difficult to identify, do not have formal em-
ployer-employee relationships that are conducive to
collecting contributions, and may have irregular incomes
that lead to defaults on contributions.
In an effort to extend coverage to the informal sector,
many countries have implemented community-based
health insurance (CBHI), or some other model of volun-
tary health insurance (VHI). However, a large body of
literature shows that the vast majority of CBHI and
other voluntary schemes fail to reach a large proportion
of their target population, and in the absence of sub-
sidies most schemes exclude the poor [5-9]. Despite the
challenges of expanding coverage through CBHI and
other voluntary health insurance schemes, these schemes
continue to feature prominently in low-income countries’
health financing strategies. Reasons for relying on CBHI
relate to the desire to bypass national-level challenges
such as national tax collection systems or extension of
social health insurance from the formal sector to the
often poorer informal sector population [10]. Some
are optimistic that CBHI will serve as a stepping
stone to national insurance schemes, and cite historic
precedents, such as Japan, where voluntary insuranceschemes evolved into nationwide health insurance
schemes [11].
The situation in Lao PDR is not dissimilar to other
countries that have relied, at least to some extent, on
voluntary health insurance to cover the informal sector.
In Laos, CBHI has been operating since 2001 with
technical and financial assistance from various donors.
However, following 12 years of operation, the scheme
covers just over two percent of the population [12].
Nevertheless, the government’s health financing strategy
and support by some development partners is premised
on the belief that the scheme can be expanded and that
CBHI can provide an important basis for making
progress towards universal coverage. But given CBHI’s
low coverage to date, it is worth understanding both the
factors affecting enrolment in voluntary health insurance
and the prospects of expanding CBHI to new districts in
the future. Thus, the objectives of this study are twofold:
1) to examine the relative importance of factors driving
household enrolment in areas where CBHI is already
operating, with a particular interest in knowing whether
health status and socioeconomic status are significant
determinants of enrolment; 2) to explore the likelihood
that CBHI can be further expanded geographically to
new districts by comparing characteristics of districts
with and without CBHI. Given the variation in CBHI
schemes globally, these policy questions relate not just
to CBHI schemes, but to voluntary health insurance
more broadly. Thus, the results from the study are used
to draw inferences about the role that voluntary
insurance can play in achieving universal coverage in
Lao PDR, as well as other low- and middle-income
countries.
The setting
Lao PDR remains one of the poorest countries in
South-East Asia, and is ranked 138th out of 187
countries on the Human Development Index [13].
The population of 6.1 million is low by regional stan-
dards and, with 49 distinctive ethnic groups and four
main ethno-linguistic families, is the most ethnically
and linguistically diverse in mainland South-East Asia
[14]. Although the country has achieved much pro-
gress in reducing poverty and child mortality over the
last decade, poverty rates are high and significant
challenges remain in improving health outcomes,
which are among the poorest in the region. Like
many of its neighbours, Laos is transitioning from an
agricultural socialist economy to a market-oriented
economy, and growth is relatively strong due to increased
integration with neighbouring countries and development
of mining and hydropower [15]. Growth in these sectors
is expected to increase fiscal space, which is currently low










Figure 1 Coverage of health insurance and health equity funds
in Lao PDR, 2011.
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The main network for the provision of health services is
the public sector but the shift to a market-economy has
facilitated growth of the private health sector, which
is still relatively small, largely unregulated, and exists
mainly in urban areas. Utilization of government ser-
vices is low: the likelihood of an individual seeking care
from a modern health provider when ill was 18% in
2008 [17]. In urban areas, private pharmacies and clinics
are often the first choice of care [18,19] and many
people use health services in neighbouring Thailand
provinces, where the majority of health workers speak
Isan Thai, a dialect of the Lao language, as their native
tongue [20,21].
Although historically, health care was financed through
the government budget, revolving drug funds and user
fees were adopted in the 1990s to secure access to essen-
tial medicines and increase revenues to the health sector
[22,23]. In 1995, a user fee exemption policy was put in
place, but was not operationalized due to lack of clear
criteria for identifying the poor, and lack of financial
support to providers for exempted patients [24]. Thus, the
burden of financing falls largely on households, with out-
of-pocket payments accounting for 61% of overall health
spending in 2010 [25]. Government spending on health as
a percentage of total health expenditures is much lower
than other countries in the region (33% compared with
75% in Thailand) [25] and accounts for less than 1% of
GDP [17]. Much of the public expenditure on health
(75%) covers salaries for health care workers, and
therefore facilities are dependent on revenues from the
revolving drug funds to cover recurrent costs and to fund
top-ups to staff to augment their low salaries [26]. Thus,
there is an incentive for providers to overprescribe non-
essential and non-generic drugs and diagnostic tests.
Drugs are often charged at a higher profit margin than the
official rates and charges are not always displayed in
pharmacies [21,27].
In an attempt to increase access to health services,
increase financial protection, and generate resources for
the health sector, the Government of Laos is trying to
expand coverage of health insurance and risk protection
schemes. The ultimate goal is achievement of universal
coverage [28], and to this end the government has intro-
duced four main schemes: a mandatory Civil Servants’
Scheme for government employees (now termed State
Authority for Social Security (SASS)); a mandatory Social
Health Insurance scheme for private and state-owned
enterprises, run by the Social Security Organization
(SSO); voluntary community-based health insurance for
the informal sector and self-employed workers; and health
equity funds (HEFs) for households living in extreme
poverty. However, outside the SASS scheme, which targets
approximately 5.2% of the population and reachesapproximately 98% of its target group, coverage of
schemes is low, as Figure 1 shows. Community-based
health insurance targets roughly 50% of the population,
but covers only 2.2% of the population; SHI targets the
formal sector, which comprises roughly 5% of the popula-
tion, but the scheme covers only 1.7% of the population;
and HEFs target the poor – roughly one third of the
population – but cover approximately 5% of the popula-
tion. Thus, only about 14% of the population is currently
covered by risk-pooling schemes.
Overview of CBHI
The Lao CBHI scheme bears closer resemblance to the
voluntary schemes in Asia e.g., voluntary health insurance
in Vietnam and China, than to other CBHI schemes in
sub-Saharan Africa, in that it is predominantly managed
by the government rather than the community. Risk-
pooling takes place at the district level whereby the MOH
contracts with district hospitals to provide services for
CBHI members and a gatekeeping system requires mem-
bers to first seek services at the contracted facility in their
district before being referred to central or provincial
hospitals. In provincial capitals where CBHI is oper-
ational, however, members can directly access provin-
cial or regional hospitals without referral. The benefit
package for members covers outpatient and inpatient
services and drugs purchased at hospitals and is similar to
the health care benefits in the country’s two formal sector
schemes.
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as households who are self-employed or working in the
informal sector and are not covered by other social
health protection schemes. Enrollment takes place at the
household level and the premium varies according to
urban or rural residence and number of household
members. The contribution rates were originally set at
between 2.5 to 3 percent of average household income
[29] for the country, and therefore would account for a
greater share of income among the informal sector.
Scheme contributions are collected on a monthly basis by
village collectors. These collectors are mostly appointed
by village authorities. They receive very small fees for each
enrolled household, often incur uncovered costs such
as fuel, and often have little motivation to perform the
expected tasks. As a result of problems with the fee
collection system, e.g., village collectors do not always
collect contributions, some villages have moved to a
system whereby villagers make their payments directly to
the CBHI account manager at the district hospital.
Implementation of CBHI in Laos has been highly
selective. Predominantly urban and semi-urban areas
were targeted first, because health care services were
perceived to be of a reasonable quality in those areas
and the socioeconomic status of the target population
was deemed high enough to make the premiums afford-
able. The targeted villages were also selected for their
close proximity to the district hospital. The rationale for
this selective implementation was to strengthen the
scheme in the areas that were considered the “easiest” to
reach. However, by December 2011, the schemes were
operating in 26 districts, where they reached only 8% of
the population in those districts (and 11% of the villages
that had been targeted in those districts). The Govern-
ment of Laos plans to expand to more remote areas,
where enrolment is expected to be even more challen-
ging than in urban areas. However, evidence about the
profile of districts that have been both targeted and not
targeted by CBHI has been largely anecdotal. More in-
formation is needed about why household enrolment is
so low in the targeted districts, but it is also important
to understand district-level factors that would hinder or
facilitate future expansion.
This study explores the determinants of enrolment at
the household level through use of quantitative and
qualitative methods, and then goes one step further to
systematically assess how districts with and without
CBHI differ, in terms of distance to health facilities,
ethnicity (a proxy for health-seeking behavior), popula-
tion density, and other factors that are expected to affect
the demand for health care and insurance. The objective
is to use the findings from the household and district
level to shed light on the prospects for expanding CBHI
nationally.Methods
In this study we examined the prospects of expanding
enrolment of CBHI using two distinct approaches. To
examine the determinants of enrolment in CBHI at the
household level, we collected data using a household
survey and focus group discussions. To examine the
factors associated with roll-out of insurance at the
district level, we compiled a database of district level
variables and compared characteristics between districts
with and without CBHI. These approaches are discussed
in detail, below.
Household and village surveys
The household survey was conducted using a case-
comparison study design, with households enrolled in
CBHI (herein referred to as CBHI households) and
unenrolled households recruited from villages where
CBHI had been implemented. The sample consisted of
3000 households, selected from 87 villages across 6 dis-
tricts (3 provinces: Hatxaifong and Sissatanak in Vientiane
Capital; Viengkham, Phonehong, and Keodoum in Vientiane
Province; and Champasack district in Champasak prov-
ince). CBHI households were eligible for the study if they
had been enrolled for at least one year. This one year
period was defined because the recall period for health
care utilization and expenditures was one year. A two-
stage cluster sample was randomly selected: first, villages
were selected with probability proportional to population;
then households were randomly selected in one of two
ways. CBHI member households were randomly selected
from member lists in villages, while comparison house-
holds were randomly selected from the village registry.
For every CBHI household, two comparison households
were selected. The rationale for this ratio was to ensure an
adequate pool of comparison households was available for
the impact evaluation, the results of which are presented
separately [30]. The sample of CBHI households compri-
sed 30% of all households enrolled in CBHI across the six
districts at the time of the study.
Data collection took place from February to April,
2009. The household survey included multiple measures
of health status and risk preferences as well as factors
related to preferences for modern health care. We also
measured perceived quality of care at the household
and village level. To measure socioeconomic status
we developed an aggregate consumption measure, by
compiling data on the types of food and non-food items
that households either purchased, produced them-
selves, or obtained through nonfinancial transactions.
Data were then combined to give per capita consump-
tion quintiles, with per capita rates calculated using an
equivalent scale.
Prior to conducting the survey, interviewers obtained in-
formed consent from participants and screened households
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head of household, where possible. The interviewee was
also asked to answer questions about other household
members. The response rates for the CBHI and non-
CBHI strata were 99.7% and 96.9%, respectively.
Descriptive data analysis was performed using Stata
10.1 to better understand which types of households
typically enrol in CBHI. CBHI and non-CBHI house-
holds were compared on a range of characteristics and
univariate analysis was performed. All estimates account
for sampling weights and village-level clustering. To
perform the multivariate analysis on the determinants of
enrolment, a probit model was used. The probability of
enrolment is a function of individual/household and
village characteristics, such that:
Pr y ¼ 1 xÞ ¼ f X1;X2;ε
 
where y = 1 for an enrolled household and y = 0 for an
uninsured household; X1 represents individual and
household characteristics; X2 is a vector of village level
characteristics; and ε represents the error term. The
model uses sampling weights and accounts for the
cluster effects at the village level. However, because the
probit model assumes a nonlinear relationship between
the independent variables and the outcome variable, the
marginal effects are not constant. Instead, the relation-
ship between an x-variable and the outcome depends on
the level of x as well as the level of other independent
variables. Therefore, to better understand the relation-
ship between independent variables and the outcome
(enrolment), predicted probabilities were estimated.
These predicted probabilities represent the probability
that a household with a certain characteristic will enrol
in CBHI when all other factors are held constant at
their mean value and were estimated using the SPost
programme in Stata [31]. Comparing predicted pro-
babilities for “representative individuals” shows how the
probability of enrolment changes as the variable of
interest changes.
Because enrolment was measured using a cross-
sectional survey, it was important to acknowledge that
the relationship between independent variables and
enrolment could be endogenous and endogeneity of con-
sumption was a primary concern. To partially address this
endogeneity problem, health care expenditures were
excluded from the aggregate consumption measure and
quintiles of consumption were used in place of an absolute
measure. However, it is still possible that the relationship
between consumption and enrolment is endogenous (i.e.,
the level of non-medical consumption in a household
could still be affected by whether or not the household
took up CBHI).In addition to using consumption quintiles to look at
the relationship between wealth and enrolment, a house-
hold asset index, constructed using principal compo-
nents analysis, was used in the multivariate analysis.
Relative to consumption, an asset index is more likely to
reflect longer-run household wealth or living standards,
and is less likely to account for short-run interruptions
or shocks to the household [32]. Although there is some
correlation between consumption and the asset index,
the asset index also has an independent effect on enrol-
ment, which justifies its inclusion in the model.
Despite the steps taken to reduce endogeneity, the
main limitation of this study is the cross-sectional nature
of the data, which makes it difficult to infer causation
between an independent variable and enrolment. How-
ever, qualitative work conducted with CBHI members
and non-members as part of this study, help to validate
and support interpretation of results. Detailed findings
from focus group discussions are presented separately
[30], but are briefly described below and referenced in
this paper where appropriate.
Focus group discussions with households
Focus group discussions (FGDs) were held in six villages
where CBHI is running: three groups included members
and three included non-members, which totalled 55
individual participants. Villages were purposively selected
from the list of villages where the survey was conducted
previously. An effort was made to choose villages with a
range of CBHI coverage levels, varying distance to the
district hospital, and of varying size. The FGDs focused on
five main topics: knowledge of CBHI (and details of imple-
mentation); motivation for enrolment/non-enrolment/
dropping-out; experiences and perceptions of the scheme
and of the health care system; impact of enrolment/non-
enrolment on use of services, expenditures, and source of
care; and recommendations for improving the scheme.
The FGD guide was translated into Lao and discussions
were conducted using a local female moderator with
experience conducting FGDs in Laos. Training and
pilot testing were conducted over a four day period
in Vientiane Capital in May 2009, and data collection
took place thereafter and lasted for 6 days. Verbal consent
was given by all participants and all discussions were
audio recorded. Data were translated and transcribed and
analysed using thematic analysis [33] and were used to
help interpret and validate the quantitative findings.
District level secondary data
In the second phase of the study, we examined the likeli-
hood of expanding enrolment to new areas. To do this,
we compiled district-level data and compared character-
istics of districts with and without insurance to assess
the likelihood of scaling-up geographically. We use a
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explore differences between the two groups. The multi-
variate analysis is a probit model, which models the
factors associated with roll-out of CBHI to the districts.
The independent variables include: poverty rate, popula-
tion density, literacy rate, the percentage of nonagri-
cultural employment, the percent of households with
electricity, distance to the district hospital, ethnicity (i.e.,
Tai-Kadai vs. other), and religion (i.e., Buddhist vs. other).
These indicators were compiled from the Lao Socioeco-
nomic Atlas [14] and data from the MOH, CBHI office.
Ethics
The MoH approved the implementation of the survey
and focus group discussions and ethical approval for the
study was granted by the ethics committees at the
National Institute of Public Health in Laos and London
School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM) in
the United Kingdom.
Results
Table 1 presents the results of the descriptive statistics
at the household level. The results show that CBHI
households are larger, more likely to be married, and
more educated than uninsured households. There is no
difference in ethnicity between CBHI and comparison
households: most households in the sample belong to
the Tai-Kadai ethnic group. CBHI households have sig-
nificantly higher consumption levels than uninsured
households but similar per capita consumption levels.
Per capita income levels are also similar between groups
and are just below the national average of $880 per
capita. There is no significant difference in the number
of CBHI and comparison households living below the
national poverty line: across the sample, 21.4% of house-
holds live in poverty. This percentage is less than the
estimated poverty headcount in the population (37%).
Thus, the sample has a lower average income level than
the population but also has fewer households living in
poverty, which makes sense given that CBHI targets the
near-poor informal sector, but not the poorest or richest
households. Among households in which the household
head is employed, the insured are more likely than the
uninsured to hold a long-term contract.
In terms of health status, CBHI households are less
healthy than uninsured households, as shown by the
CBHI group’s poorer self-rated health, higher prevalence
of disability or chronic illness, higher proportion of
households who reported difficulty performing activities,
and a higher proportion of households in which a house-
hold member has deteriorating health. CBHI households
also have more elderly household members, more
women of reproductive age, more pregnant women, and
are relatively less risk-averse than uninsured households.Attitudes towards different sources of care serve as
proxies for preferences for modern health care over trad-
itional. The descriptive findings show that attitudes are
similar among CBHI and non-CBHI households. How-
ever, CBHI households report a higher perception of qual-
ity of health care at the district hospital. CBHI members
are also more likely than the uninsured to have attended a
CBHI campaign, to have more close relatives and friends
in the scheme, and to place higher trust in the scheme.
Multivariate findings
Figure 2 shows the predicted probabilities of enrolment
for representative households. Households with primary
or secondary education have a higher predicted prob-
ability of enrolment than those with no education, but
this difference is not significant. However, the probability
of enrolment is significantly higher for those with
vocational training or post-secondary education.
Health status and economic well-being, and their
relationship with enrolment in CBHI, were of particular
interest in this study. Results show that households in
which a family member has either a chronic illness or
had difficulty performing regular activities in the past
three months (a proxy measure for illness) were signifi-
cantly more likely to enroll in CBHI than households
with no signs of illness. Although CBHI members had
higher self-assessed health than non-members, this
relationship was not significant. A pregnancy in the
household and a higher number of women of reproduct-
ive age in the household was significantly associated with
enrolment, but having an elderly family member or a
child under the age of five was not significantly associ-
ated with enrolment.
The FGDs support the quantitative findings: in all
FGDs, the most frequently cited reason for enrolling was
that family members suffer from chronic conditions,
while in non-member households the second most
frequently reported reason for never enrolling in the
scheme was that people were healthy. Two examples
from the FGDs illustrate these points.
“Joining CBHI is really convenient as I often see
doctors about my diabetes and high blood pressure.
Sometimes it is not only me who sees the doctors, but
also my family members: one person has a fever or
another person has a problem with his stomach”.-CBHI member from Ban Donetalarth, Champasak
district“No one in my family gets sick; I am not really
interested in this scheme. When someone in my
family gets sick, we just go to the hospital like
normal patients”.
Table 1 Background characteristics of CBHI and comparison populations
CBHI (n = 1000) Comparison (n = 2000) p-value
Sociodemographic characteristics
Mean household size (persons) 5.3 4.7 <0.001**
Marital status of household head (% married) 84.2% 80.4% 0.027*
Education
Highest level = any primary 43.1% 42.7% 0.866
Highest level = any secondary 31.6% 37.2% 0.028*
Highest level = university/institute 5.1% 2.3% 0.002**
Highest level = vocational 11.8% 8.4% 0.020*
Age of HH head (mean years) 52.4 48.4 <0.001**
HH is member of ethnic majority (1 = Tai-Kadai; 0 = other) 98.6% 98.2% 0.404
Total annual household consumption ($US) $3,162 $2,729 <0.001**
Total annual per capita consumption, mean ($US)a $754 $741 0.531
Total annual per capita income, mean ($US) $863 $845.9 0.822
HHs living below $1.25 per day 21.6% 20.3% 0.435
Employment status
Not working for money 21.1% 17.2% 0.009**
Family farm-based agriculture 24.0% 22.8% 0.644
Small-scale trading or family business 26.4% 31.2% 0.039*
Work for someone else 28.5% 28.8% 0.878
HH heads with long-term employment contract (12 months +) 17.2% 11.6% 0.002**
Household is located in urban area (vs. semi-urban or rural) 30.1% 33.9% 0.413
Health status and risk aversion
HHs in which avg self-rated health is <3 on scale of 1 to 5 19.4% 14.9% 0.023*
HHs in which someone has disability or chronic condition 23.4% 14.5% <0.001**
HHs in which someone had difficulty with activities in 3 months 16.3% 11.0% 0.008**
HHs in which s/o experienced deterioration of health in past year 11.9% 8.5% .034*
Risk preferences: head of household is risk-averseb 37.1% 41.6% 0.041*
Other risk variables
HHs with any member age 65+ 28.0% 21.9% .001**
HHs with any member age 0-5 37.0% 37.6% 0.754
Mean # of females 15–49 1.6 1.4 <0.001**
HHs in which a woman has given birth in past 2 years 15.7% 13.9% 0.261
HHs with a pregnant woman 4.4% 2.3% .004**
Attitudes towards sources of care and quality perceptions
HH respondents recommending a government hospital for an uninsured friend.
A severe condition/emergency? 99.4% 99.5% 0.669
A moderate condition? 94.6% 92.6% 0.138
A minor condition? 97.5% 96.8% 0.42
HH respondents stating that services at district hospital are good 75.4% 64.8% <0.001**
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Table 1 Background characteristics of CBHI and comparison populations (Continued)
Exposure to CBHI and trust in scheme
HH attended CBHI campaign 92.5% 66.2% <0.001**
How many of your close relatives/friends had joined CBHI prior to enrolment?
(or how many are enrolled now?)
None 4.5% 30.7%
Some 49.2% 48.9% <0.001**
Many 46.3% 20.4%
HHs reporting trust that contributions will be used properly 92.5% 69.7% <0.001**
HHs reporting that members will get the benefits they pay for when they need them 95.8% 69.4% <0.001**
*Significant at 5%;**significant at 1%. Reported results are based on t-tests of means for continuous variables and chi-squares for proportions/categorical variables.
All estimates account for sampling weights and village-level clustering. aPer capita expenditure was calculated using adult equivalents. bThis question presents the
respondent with a gamble in which he/she must guess which hand contains money. The first pick is the same regardless of the hand selected but in the next
bets, the stakes become increasingly higher. The variable was dichotomized to differentiate those who were completely risk averse from those who will take at
least some risk. This methodology was adapted from a study in India by [34] and was also used by Krishnan et al, 2010 [35].
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The study found that people who are very risk averse
are actually less likely to enroll in CBHI. Qualitative
interviews shed light on why this may be the case.
Although the majority of the respondents in the FGDs
reported that enrolling in CBHI allows people to minim-
ise their risk, some felt that enrolling in CBHI is a risky
venture and that enrolment actually increases risk,
because one can’t be sure that benefits will be delivered
when they are needed.
“I am taking a risk by putting money into the
scheme because after two years if the scheme
collapses I will not get anything from it.”Figure 2 Predicted probability of enrollment by household characteri-Member from Ban Thamouong, Hatxaifong district
When other factors are held constant, households that
are better-off financially (measured by per capita con-
sumption) are significantly more likely to enroll in CBHI.
However, the marginal effect of consumption on enroll-
ment diminishes as wealth increases. Households in the
highest quintile are not much more likely to enroll in
health insurance than those in the fourth quintile. This
makes sense given that CBHI does not target the rich.
According to a FGD participant, “rich people are not inter-
ested in joining this scheme because they have money and
when they get sick they can choose wherever they like to go
for treatment; mostly they will go to private clinics, then to
the central hospital or to Thailand”. The most frequent
reason for never enrolling in CBHI was the inability tostics.
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why his family’s financial situation prevents him from
enrolling:
“For me, it’s already difficult to pay for our monthly
expenditure. I don’t have enough money. My four
children also go to school; sometimes I cannot earn
money for their school on time. Then I have other
expenses such as water bill, electricity bill, and rice
farming. It costs more than 1 million kip per year.
So the money I earn is spent on many things. There
are eight people in my family; they sometimes get
sick but not very serious illness. I sometimes borrow
money from others when my children get sick”.-Non-member from Ban Phonehang, Viengkham
district
The study found that almost all households in the
sample belong to the Tai-Kadai ethnic group, and almost
all households have a preference for modern health care
over traditional care. Therefore, these factors do not
explain differences in enrollment in this sample. As
shown in Figure 2, a higher perception of quality of
health care is associated with enrollment in CBHI.
However, this relationship could be endogenous, due to
the cross-sectional nature of the data: it is plausible that
higher quality reported by CBHI members is a result of
being in the scheme, rather than a factor affecting enrol-
ment (e.g., CBHI members may have more contact with
the district hospitals or a better experience overall
because they don’t have to pay for health care). The
focus group discussions shed light on the relationship
between quality perceptions and enrolment, as several
dimensions of quality were explored in the qualitative
work (see Alkenbrack, 2011). Across all six FGDs, CBHI
members and non-members agreed that non-members,
who pay for services at the point of service delivery,
receive services faster than CBHI members regardless of
the urgency of health care needs.
“When CBHI members go to the hospital and show their
membership card, the hospital workers ignore them and
make them wait for a very long time. But if people with
money come to the hospital, the staff gives them faster
services — they need not wait long! In some cases, when
CBHI members have an emergency or very serious
illness, they do not receive priority treatment. Instead,
they are kept for a very long time and have to wait their
turn. So some people would die before they get their
turn! This is why some people drop out”.-Non-member from Ban Thamouong, Hatxaifong
districtAcross all six villages where FGDs were held, partici-
pants complained that CBHI members usually receive
low quality drugs, while non-members are prescribed a
variety of more expensive drugs. CBHI members are also
reportedly treated with less respect than cash-paying
patients. Aside from the differential treatment given to
members and non-members, health care workers re-
portedly provide faster treatment to patients who have
money or who have relatives working in the hospital.
Several participants also mentioned that children are
given preferential treatment over adults. However,
quality of service delivery is reportedly poor in general.
Both members and non-members reported that health
care staff members do not have the skills to diagnose
health problems and that productivity is low. For
example, some FGD participants described the behav-
iour of health care workers as “lazy”, explaining that
“they just sit there and ignore patients with CBHI”.
Although a few respondents complained about the
cleanliness of the hospital, most participants felt that the
facilities were clean but that lack of equipment is a
problem in the district hospitals. Thus, results from the
FGDs contradict the quantitative findings, which indi-
cated that CBHI members have higher perceptions of
quality than non-CBHI members. It is therefore more
likely that members who have positive experiences with
CBHI maintain enrolment in CBHI, and less likely that
perceptions of good quality of care at district hospitals
are enticing households to enrol in the scheme.
District-level findings (from secondary data analysis)
The district-level findings compare CBHI and non-CBHI
districts on various characteristics (See Table 2). Findings
from the univariate analysis show that, relative to non-
CBHI districts, CBHI districts have a significantly higher
population density, lower poverty rates, higher literacy
rates, and a higher proportion of the population working
in the non-agricultural sector. CBHI districts are also
significantly more likely to have electricity than non-
CBHI districts. On average, residents of non-CBHI
districts are located three times further from a health
facility than CBHI districts, and are significantly more
likely to belong to an ethnic minority and a non-
Buddhist households. Results from the multivariate
analysis (probit), are shown in Table 3 and show that
only two variables are significantly associated with
enrolment in CBHI, including a higher percentage of
labor in non-agricultural activities and closer proximity
to the nearest health facility.
Discussion
The findings generated from this study reveal useful
information about CBHI in Laos, its members, and their
experiences and allow us to gain insight into the
Table 2 Univariate analysis of differences between CBHI
and non-CBHI districts
CBHI (26) Non-CBHI (114) t-test
Population density (per km2) 184.62 46.42 −2.571*
Poverty rate (%) 29.6 40.1 3.386**
Literacy rate (%) 79.00 64.2 −4.061**
% of labor non-agriculture 33.38 12.09 −5.868**
% HHs with electricity 73.7 41.87 −5.948**






% pop Buddhist 79.48 53.29 −3.71**
*Significant at 5%;**significant at 1%. Reported results are based on t-tests of
means. When these variables are modelled using a probit model, only two
variables are significant: the percentage of labor in non-agriculture activities,
and time to the nearest health facility.
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first research question examined the relative importance
of factors driving households’ enrolment in CBHI and
found that the decision to enroll in CBHI is influenced
by a range of factors at the household level including
education, health status, risk attitudes, socioeconomic
status, and quality perceptions. Four of the household
level findings are of particular interest. First, the study
found that illness is driving enrolment in CBHI, indica-
ting that the scheme suffers from adverse selection, and
the use of multiple health status measures through the
household surveys, as well as the qualitative work, help
to understand this relationship. The finding that adverse
selection is present in the scheme supports literature
from Senegal, Thailand, India and China [36-40] but is
inconsistent with results from other studies that did not
find a link between health status and enrolment [41-45].
From a public health perspective the link between poor
health and higher enrolment is encouraging, as it indi-
cates that households with the greatest need for healthTable 3 Marginal effects of district-level factors associated
with roll-out of CBHI
CBHI M.E. S.E. P > |z|
Poverty rate (%) 0.120446 0.261431 0.636
Literacy rate (%) −0.0871 0.287819 0.759
Population density (per km2) −0.00048 0.000339 0.121
% of labor non-agriculture 0.004238 0.002691 0.038*
% HHs with electricity 0.002023 0.001606 0.132
time to nearest health center (mins) −0.00152 0.000426 0.011*
% pop Lao-tai (vs. ethnic minority) 0.00101 0.000915 0.214
% pop Buddhist −0.00185 0.001206 0.136
Number of observations 137
*Significant at 5%; Pseudo R2 = 0.3671; Log pseudoliklihood = −41.195;
Prob > chi2 < .001.care services are purchasing insurance. However, from a
sustainability perspective, the results are discouraging.
Given that all members play a flat-rate premium regard-
less of their risk profile, adverse selection can drive up
the cost of health care per insured member and can
ultimately threaten the sustainability and financial
viability of the scheme.
Another key finding is that the poor are less likely to
enroll in health insurance than the better-off, which
raises concern in that the scheme does not provide
financial protection for the poorest. These results are
consistent with much of the enrolment literature
[37,40,41,43,46,47]. With the exception of a few villages
where health equity funds are operating alongside CBHI
schemes, there are no subsidies in place to cover the
cost of CBHI premiums for the poor, and therefore no
cross-subsidization in overall health care financing, as
another study from Laos confirms [48]. Nor is a sys-
tematic targeting scheme in place for identifying poor
households. Given that the poor are most vulnerable to
catastrophic health payments [49,50], it is important that
strategies to expand risk-protection schemes target the
poorest. However, given the current financing arrange-
ments in Laos, CBHI is unlikely to increase financial
protection among the poor in areas where subsidies for
the poor are not available.
The third notable finding from the household survey
is that households with greater risk aversion are less
likely to enrol in insurance. On the face of it, this finding
seems to contradict insurance theory, which holds that
individuals who are relatively more risk averse will be
more likely to enrol in health insurance due to the desire
to protect themselves from health-related financial loss
in the future [51]. However, it is important to note that
expected utility theory assumes that insurance is a risk-
minimizing strategy and that the scheme will offer
protection. As noted in the literature, many schemes are
poorly managed [6,52,53]. Moreover, in low-capacity
environments, quality of care of covered services is often
poor and therefore the features of CBHI may not be
risk-minimizing relative to other options. For example,
individuals who perceive the public health care system
to be of low quality may view enrolling in CBHI (which
requires users to first seek services at the district
hospital in the public system, where quality is reportedly
poor) as less attractive than remaining uninsured. Thus,
purchasing insurance for some could actually be con-
sidered more risky than not purchasing insurance,
especially among the poor, for whom a given loss can be
ruinous [54-56]. The findings on the relationship
between risk and enrolment in CBHI in this study are
consistent with a study that found that risk-averse
households are less likely to purchase rainfall insurance
among farmers in India [57].
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of quality of care is an important factor affecting enrol-
ment in CBHI in that those who perceive quality to be
poor are less likely to enrol. The complaints about low
quality of public health care in Laos are consistent with
what other studies from Laos have reported [18,21].
Poor quality of care remains a source of dissatisfaction
for both members and non-members and is one of the
major reasons for leaving the scheme. A recently
published study from Laos confirms that cash-paying
patients receive more expensive drugs than insured
patients but that the insured receive more appropriate
care than the uninsured as a result [58]. However, based
on the qualitative findings, it seems that the insured
perceive themselves as being underserviced in terms of
the number of drugs received: in the FGDs, even non-
members claim that treatment is better for paying
patients. Differential treatment would not be surprising
given that capitation payments are low and do not cover
costs, and that providers depend on the fees charged by
paying patients to operate the facilities. Thus, strategies
that aim to improve quality overall, and improve equality
of treatment between the insured and uninsured will be
important factors affecting insurance uptake in the
future. If people do not perceive the health services as
valuable, they will be less inclined to enrol. In a review
of lessons learned from CBHI schemes in sub-Saharan
Africa, Wiesman and Jütting state that quality improve-
ment should not be expected as an outcome of resource
mobilisation via insurance, but must be considered a
necessary precondition for successful implementation of
CBHI [59]. Another study in China suggests that one
strategy for promoting better quality, while containing
costs, is to delink income of health facilities from drug
sales [60]. Improving quality of care in Lao PDR will
require greater government investment, for example, in
facilities and equipment, human resources, or increased
financing of recurrent costs.
The second research question explored in this study
focused on the likelihood that CBHI can be expanded
further in Laos by comparing the profiles of districts
with and without CBHI. The district level findings show
that people in districts where CBHI is operating reside
closer to the health facilities, and that these districts are
more densely populated, more urban, have lower poverty
rates, higher literacy rates, and a lower percentage of
ethnic minorities. However, even though it is expected
that these districts would be the “easiest to reach”, CBHI
still only serves a fraction of the target population after
more than a decade since the inception of the scheme.
As the MOH attempts to expand the scheme to new
areas - that are further away from health facilities, less
densely populated, more rural, and with higher poverty
rates, lower literacy rates, and a higher percentage ofethnic minorities - recruiting new members will likely
prove even more difficult.
The study has shown that CBHI in Laos is not
adequately pooling risks across the healthy, sick, rich,
and poor. The low enrolment, combined with adverse
selection, threatens countries’ ability to raise sufficient
revenues and achieve financial sustainability. After more
than a decade of reaching the most accessible areas, the
scheme still only reaches a small fraction of the target
population. Global experience has shown that CBHI and
other voluntary schemes have failed to achieve high
coverage rates [5,10,61,62]. Yet CBHI remains a corner-
stone of the Government’s plan for achieving universal
coverage and is the only scheme that currently targets
the large informal sector. Given this, what are the
options for building on the experiences to date to make
broad-based progress towards universal coverage?
While some countries have attempted to rely on
voluntary schemes to cover the informal sector, more
successful reforms have extended tax-financed, or sub-
sidized mandatory schemes to the informal sector.
Thailand, for example, experimented with a CBHI
scheme for several decades but after evidence showed
that the voluntary scheme was not achieving high cover-
age rates in the informal sector, the scheme was eventu-
ally rolled into a tax-financed scheme, which covers the
poor and non-poor informal sector and all those not
covered by the formal sector schemes. Thailand’s new
(mandatory) tax-financed scheme, known as the Uni-
versal Coverage scheme, has proven to be a much
more effective, equitable and efficient means of cover-
ing the informal sector and administratively, is much less
complex [63,64]. Mexico has also been successful in
expanding insurance by offering households not covered
by the formal sector, the option of enrolling in a separate
subsidized public health insurance program known as
Seguro Popular. The contribution is fully subsidized for
the poor, while the non-poor make a contribution accord-
ing to their ability to pay [65]. In contrast, countries such
as Vietnam, the Philippines, and Colombia have attempted
to cover the informal sector through extension of SHI, but
the success of doing so depends on the formalization
of the labor market and effectiveness of enforcement
mechanisms. In environments where enforcement and
regulatory capacity are weak, and the formal sector is
small, covering the informal sector through a com-
bination of taxation and donor funds could be admin-
istratively more efficient than trying to expand or
mandate enrolment among the informal sector. Thus,
a valuable lesson from these countries is that social
protection works best when it is not tied to employ-
ment status.
It is also clear that a key requirement for achieving
universal coverage is an increase in government funding
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matic payroll or tax deductions difficult to implement or
enforce on a broad scale, but increasing government rev-
enues is generally feasible even in the poorest countries.
A recent review of nine countries that have made pro-
gress toward universal coverage found that all countries
have increased government spending as a percentage of
total health expenditure since launching the reforms (be-
tween 5 and 11 percentage points in Ghana, Rwanda,
Vietnam, and Indonesia, and between 1 and 3 percent-
age points in India, Kenya, Mali, and Nigeria). In India,
Indonesia, Ghana, Nigeria, Vietnam, and the Philippines,
the government increased tax revenues to fund coverage
expansion, despite the challenges of tax collection.
In other countries, increases in revenues have come
from a mix of prepayment mechanisms that, in addition
to general taxation, include earmarked taxes, value-
added taxes, payroll deductions, and (to a lesser ex-
tent) household premium contributions. By increasing
revenues, most countries have reduced out-of-pocket
household payments for health care and have ex-
tended subsidies to target populations such as the
poor, pregnant women, and children [67]. It is this
combination of a rise in health spending per capita,
and a rising share of pooled health expenditures
within this total, that characterize the health financing
transition [66].
Although government spending on health in Laos is
very low by international standards, there are good pros-
pects for government spending on health to increase
over the coming years: hydropower and other natural
resource revenues have gained importance, and impro-
ved tax administration is contributing to increased
revenue collection. Both these factors will help generate
increased fiscal space over the medium term, and pro-
vide an opportunity to significantly increase government
health spending. But where should increased govern-
ment spending be directed? There are a number of
options. Government could increase investment spend-
ing to improve facilities and equipment; it could invest
in human resources for longer-term improvement of
service quality; it could increase financing of non-wage
recurrent costs at facility level, and in that way reduce
reliance on out-of-pocket payments (at least for some
priority services); and it could provide direct subsidies to
CBHI and Health Equity Funds to increase enrollment
and expand benefits of these schemes. Alternatively, it
may be feasible to finance a limited package of essential
services for those not covered by formal insurance
schemes. In fact, the government is currently piloting a
project that provides free deliveries in facilities. Finally,
alongside these investments, cost-containment and mea-
sures to increase efficiencies in the health system will
need to be considered.Recognizing the limitations of CBHI, it is important to
consider alternative or complementary financing mecha-
nisms, such as taxation or extension of social health
insurance. These are by no means easy options: universal
tax-financed schemes require adequate and sustained
government financing; targeted schemes require effective
targeting mechanisms; expansion of social security
depends on increased formalization of the labor market
and effective enforcement mechanisms; and contributory
schemes require effective and efficient collection sys-
tems. Moreover, regardless of the financing approach,
mechanisms for promoting quality and efficiency in
service delivery are needed. That the Government of
Lao PDR has clearly articulated a vision for achieving
universal coverage is a good start. However, it is clear
from implementation and enrolment to date that the
current path to universal coverage will be an uphill
battle. In order to achieve broad coverage of key health
services and improve financial protection, it will be
important to continue revising the health financing
strategy, using both evidence from health systems
reform within Laos and experience from other countries.
Conclusions
As low- and middle-income countries make the transi-
tion to universal coverage, CBHI and other voluntary
schemes are often introduced with the objective of
covering the informal sector. Evidence from this study
and others shows that voluntary schemes often achieve
poor risk-pooling that pose a threat to the schemes’
financial sustainability. In this study, household-level
findings indicate that the better-off, less healthy, and less
risk-averse are most likely to enroll in insurance, and
that poor quality of care prevents households from
enrolling in health insurance. The district-level findings
call into question whether or not the Government of
Laos can successfully expand to more remote, less afflu-
ent districts, with lower population density. Thus, the
evidence suggests that countries attempting to increase
coverage through voluntary health insurance will face
difficulties. Although there is no blueprint for achieving
universal coverage, it is clear that delinking employment
status and coverage is important, and that increased
government investment is a prerequisite for universal
coverage.
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